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Case and Ruling Comments on the 1964
Federal Tax Cases and Rulings*
WILLIAM P. OBERNDORFER
Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia
Member of the firm of Kaufman, Oberndorfer, Spainhour and Hall
DEATH AND WORSE
We will start, by considering a clause in a will, that has been drawn
to utilize the marital deduction benefits of section 2056.1 The clause
establishes a pecuniary bequest (either fixed or formula) to the de-
ceased's widow under which the executor (1) is authorized or directed
to satisfy the bequest in kind and (2) is directed to make any distribu-
tion at Federal estate tax values. To illustrate, suppose the widow is
entitled to a bequest equal to $250,000, and there are only two assets in
the estate, each having a Federal estate tax value of $250,000. Two
years after death, when the distribution to the widow is made, asset A is
still worth $250,000, but asset B has depreciated to a value of $100,000.
As stated, the executor has the power to distribute asset B to the widow
and, theoretically, to claim a $250,000 marital deduction. Revenue
Procedure 64-19,2 which is required study for every lawyer, states that,
in the foregoing situation, the IRS will not allow the marital deduction.
Where a will is executed prior to October 1, 1964 it may not have to
be redrafted-due to a savings provision. However, wills drafted after
October 1, 1964 must meet one of the two tests prescribed in Revenue
Procedure 64-19.
Section 2056(b) (5),' allows the marital deduction for life estates,
whether or not in trust if, among other things, the surviving spouse is
entitled for life to all the income from the entire interest (or all the
income from a specific portion thereof), payable at least annually, with
power in the surviving spouse to appoint the entire interest, or such
specific portion in favor of herself or her estate. The power must be
exercisable in all events.
In viewing the 1964 cases, it appears that a great deal of uncertainty
still exists, as to the correct method of drafting a marital trust to achieve
*This section of the Tax Conference Record has been included in the William
and Mary Law Review, Vol. 6, beginning at page 203, as a convenience to readers
of this Review.
1. INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954 § 2056 (hereafter cited CODE).
2. REV. Rul. 64-15, 1964 INT. REV. BULL. No. 30. Due to a time limitation,
Mr. Oberndorfer could not give a more detailed discussion of Revenue Procedure
64-19.
3. CODE § 2056 (b) (5).
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maximum tax benefits under the present Code and regulations. Thus, in
Pierpont,4 where the bequest was undeniably intended to qualify for the
marital deduction, a trust remainder was to go "in such manner and
proportions as my . . . wife may designate and appoint." The Fourth
Circuit, construing Maryland law and ignoring a non-adversary decision
of a Maryland court, found that the widow lacked the power to appoint
to her estate, and denied the marital deduction.
To the same effect is Stedman,5 where a widow's uncontrolled dis-
cretion to invade trust principal for her comfort and maintenance did
not suffice; under Massachusetts law her power to invade was contingent
on a good faith determination that principal was needed and, therefore,
her power was not "exercisable in all events." I assume Virginia will
follow this Massachusetts case. Notwithstanding the loss of the marital
deduction, when Mrs. Stedman dies, the property in her husband's estate
which is subject to her power of appointment may be taxed in her estate.
Under Section 2041,6 she has a taxable general power of appointment.
Her power to invade for her "comfort" is too broad-the power is not
limited by an ascertainable standard relating to her health, education,
support or maintenance. In A. Strite Exr. v. McGinnes7 the power was
held taxable despite state law imposing a standard of good faith.
In another recent case,8 it was held that the commuted value of the
dower right of a widow under Virginia law qualified for the marital
deduction.
Now, let us turn our attention to a situaton in which a testator has
left his widow the residue of his estate, that equals 50% (of the gross
estate) before deductions. In making this computation, a recent de-
cision 9 held that you must include assets passing outside the will. Thus,
a larger marital deduction was allowed under this view.
The Third Circuit recently held in Estate of M. L. Noel v. Commis-
sioner,"0 that the proceeds of a flight insurance policy, that was purchased
and owned by the beneficiary widow, were not includible in the gross
estate of the deceased husband under Section 2042." Query as to the
effect of the Noel decision on an ordinary life policy with a double in-
demnity benefit. Query whether flight insurance is protected from in-
come taxation.
4. 64-2 USTC CCH % 12,262 (4th Cir. 1964).
5. 233 F. Supp. 569 (D. Mass. 1964).
6. CODE § 2041.
7. 330 F. 2d 234 (3rd Cir. 1964).
8. 64-2 USTC CCH 12,253 (4th Cir. 1964).
9. 64-2 USTC CCH 12,264 (W.D. Mich. 1964).
10. 322 F. 2d 950 (3rd Cir. 1964).
11. CODE § 2042.
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REAL ESTATE AND RELATED AREAS
When property is involuntarily converted and replaced, the replace-
ment property must be "similar or related in service or use" 12 to avoid
gain on the involuntary conversion. For some time IRS insisted that the
replacement property must have a close "functional" similarity to the
property converted; the end uses must be similar. If an investor, such as
a lessor, owned a commercial building which he leased to a mercantile
establishment, he would have to replace it with a similar type building
which could also be leased to a mercantile establishment. Merely re-
placing it with property from which he could derive rental income
would not suffice. The appellate courts had held contrary to IRS, and
finally, in Revenue Ruling 64-237" the IRS adopted a position in accord
with the courts. Henceforth, the important factor will be the similarity
of the services or uses which the original and replacement properties
have to the particular taxpayer.
In Sexton,1 4 the taxpayer was allowed to depreciate land on which
he operated a garbage dump. He made an excavation and estimated the
value of the land when ultimately filled. Depreciation was allowed on
the investment of the empty space, based upon the quantity exhausted
by the filling with garbage each year. The five dissenting Tax Court
judges were unwilling to depreciate the elimination of air from a hole
in the ground.
One of the year's most stirring developments was the Tax Court's
limiting of the now-famous Cohn" rule. For background, suppose you
owned a building or other depreciable property costing you $100,000.
The useful life is 25 years, and you estimated no salvage value. You
held the building for 15 years, taking $60,000 depreciation, leaving you
with an adjusted basis of $40,000. You then took a half year's deprecia-
tion of $2,000. Under the Cohn case, decided in 1958, the depreciation
would be disallowed. The Sixth Circuit held that the sales price ($40,000
in our hypothetical case) is the actual salvage value of the property sold,
and in the year of sale, a taxpayer cannot depreciate his property to a
point where its adjusted basis (also $40,000 in our hypothetical case)
will go below its salvage value.
In McCabe Co.,"6 the Tax Court held contra. An office building was
12. Id., § 1033(a).
13. INT. REV. BULL. 64-35, 12.
14. 42 P-H TAx CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. No. 86 (Sept. 1964) (Hereafter cited
T.C.).
15. 259 F. 2d 371 (6th Cir. 1958). See also Fribourg Navigation Co., Inc. v.
Comm., 55 F. 2d 15 (2nd Cir. 1964).
16. 42 T.C. No. 1105 (Sept. 1964). Accord, Wyoming Builders, Inc. v. U.S.,
227 F. Supp. 534 (D. Wyo. 1964); Harry Trotz, 43 T.C. No. 13 (Nov. 1964);
C. L. Nichols, 43 T.C. No. 14 (Nov. 1964).
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sold at a price in excess of its depreciated basis. Depreciation was
allowed for the year of sale. The building was sold substantially prior
to the expiraton of its useful life, and the Tax Court held that the amount
received did not constitute or otherwise determine salvage value. The
IRS failed to take into account the distinction between the concept of
depreciation, or the gradual exhaustion of property, and the concept
of appreciation or the increase in value as a result of changes in market
conditions. The property had simply appreciated in value. The sales
price reflected the market value of the property, but this had no relation
to its salvage value. Section 1250,17 the post-1963 depreciation recapture
section, does not emasculate these decisions, and the dispute might well
end in the Supreme Court.
In Glienke v. U.S., 18 and Voss v. U.S.19 taxpayers were allowed
capital gains treatment on the sales of subdivided real estate. In each
case, the land had been placed in the hands of a real estate agent who
completely controlled the development and sale. He subdivided, hired
attorneys and set the salesprices. The owners knew nothing about de-
veloping land, and neither exercised nor attempted to exercise any con-
trol over the projects. The real estate agent was not acting as an agent
of the owners, but for his own account, as an independent contractor.
However, in W. E. Anderson,2° a farmer who had purchased farm land
and sold it as acreage to a developer, was held to realize ordinary income.
The facts here were against the taxpayer. He acquired the farm with
the intent of developing it and financed costs, such as sewers and utili-
ties, prior to conveying to the developer.
Section 453(b),21 permits income from the sale of real property to be
computed on the installment basis, subject to the regulations. The regu-
lations2 2 merely state that the taxpayer must elect the installment basis
on the return for the year in which the sale occurred. Recent decisions
supported the thesis that the election need not necessarily be made on
a timely filed return. In C'de Baca,23 the taxpayer successfully elected
on a return filed late due to his negligence; in McGillick Co.,24 the
return was filed late because the taxpayer erroneously believed he did
not have to file one; and in Reaver,2s the taxpayer successfully elected on
an amended return after failing to do so on the original one. However,
in Peter Mamula 6 the taxpayer reported a gain from the sale of real
17. CODE § 1250.
18. 64-2 USTC CCH 9762 (S.D. Ill. 1964).
19. 64-1 USTC CCH 9290 (7th Cir. 1964).
20. P-H 1964 TAx CT. MEM. 64,193.
21. CODE § 453(b).
22. Treas. Reg. 1.453-8(b) (1958).
23. 326 F. 2d 189 (5th Cir. 1964).
24. 42 T.C. No. 83 (Sept. 1964).
25. 42 T.C. No. 72 (Aug. 1964).
26. 41 T.C. No. 64 (Feb. 1964).
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estate on the deferred payment method. This method was found im-
proper and taxpayer then sought to use the installment method. He lost
on the ground that he elected a method of reporting inconsistent with
the installment method, and he did not state in his return, as required
by the regulations, that his computation of income was being reported
on the installment method.
In Hindes v. U.S.,2 7 the taxpayers created a dummy corporation to
which they sold a ranch on the installment basis. The corporation sold
the ranch for cash. Taxpayers were denied the use of the installment
sales basis on the ground that the corporation was a mere conduit and
the sale was direct to the purchaser.
In Revenue Ruling 64-205,1 8 taxpayers were allowed a contribution
deduction of the fair market value of a restrictive easement on their
property. They deeded the easement to the U.S., to enable the govern-
ment to preserve a scenic view afforded certain public properties. The
basis of the remaining property was required to be reduced by the part
of the total basis allowable to the easement.
Section 337,29 provides that if a corporation adopts a plan of complete
liquidation, and within the 12-month period beginning on the date of
the adoption of the plan, the corporation is completely liquidated, no
gain is recognized by the corporation from the sale or exchange of
property within the 12-month period. This section is frequently used by
real estate corporations.
Suppose property is destroyed by a fire, and insurance proceeds are
received. Revenue Ruling 64-100,30 revoking an earlier ruling, holds
that for purposes of section 337, the involuntary conversion constitutes
a sale or exchange. At first blush the ruling seems liberal, but it really
is not. To qualify under the ruling, the plan of liquidation must be
adopted before the fire occurs. Accordingly, the benefits of the ruling
will be confined to the more "arson-minded" taxpayer. Others, such
as Keller & Goetz, Inc.,"t will be "burned." In that case, the District
Court held, that a gain on the condemnation of real estate was realized
in 1955 when the property was condemned, rather than in 1957 when
the award was paid. Since the taxpayer had no opportunity to adopt
a plan of liquidation before condemnation, the conditions of section 337
could not be met.
When must a plan of liquidation be adopted? Obviously, it is not de-
sirable to adopt a plan before the sales contract is executed, because the
contract may never be executed. On the other hand, if the plan is
adopted after the contract is executed, the IRS might contend that the
27. 326 F. 2d 150 (5th Cir. 1964).
28. INT. REv. BULL. 64-30, 6.
29. CODE § 337.
30. INT. REV. BULL. 64-13, 8.
31. 64-2 USTC CCH % 9797 (D. N.Y. 1964).
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contract is one of sale rather than one to sell and that the sale was made
prior to the adoption of the plan.
In Alameda Realty Corp.,32 the stockholders, husband and wife,
negotiated unsuccessfully for the sale of their stock. They then caused
the corporation to execute a contract. The contract was apparently in
the customary form. At all times, on and before the contract date, the
stockholders intended to terminate the corporation's activities and dis-
tribute the sales proceeds to themselves, but no written or formal plan
of liquidation was adopted. The Tax Court held that the facts showed
such a plan existed, and therefore section 337 was applicable.
In Jeanese, Inc. v. U.S.,33 the taxpayer could not avail itself of section
337 because the real estate involved constituted inventory that was
not sold to one person in one transaction. The California District Court
described the contract as one to sell and not a contract of sale. The
buyer had not paid the per lot cash price, had not obtained a construc-
tion loan, and did not have a purchase-money note and deed of trust.
This case could actually help a taxpayer, who adopted his plan after
signing such a contract.
More a real estate than a corporate case is Commissioner v. Zongker.
3 4
A corporation purchased 100 acres, intending to sell 474 lots and retain
16 acres for commercial development. After it sold 200 lots and realized
34% of the anticipated income, the stockholders sold their stock to the
same group of purchasers. It was held that the corporation had realized
"a substantial part of the taxable income to be derived" from the
property and therefore did not meet the definition of a collapsible
corporation. The term "substantial part", as used in section 341,85
relates to the income realized prior to the sale, rather than to the amount
of income that remains to be realized.
CORPORATIONS
Under section 351," no gain or loss is recognized, if property is trans-
ferred to a corporation by one or more persons solely in exchange for
stock or securities in such corporation, and immediately after the ex-
change, such person or persons are in control of the corporation (own
at least 80% of the stock). Revenue Ruling 64-56, " 7 states that technical
"know-how" falls within the definition of "property" which can be
transferred under section 351. Ancillary and subsidiary services may be
performed in connection with the transfer.
32. 42 T.C. No. 21 (May 1964).
33. 227 F. Supp. 304 (D. Colo. 1964).
34. 334 F. 2d 44 (10th Cir. 1964).
35. CODE § 341.
36. Id., § 351.
37. INT. Rzv. BULL. 64-8, 9.
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In Estate of Heinz Schmidt, 8 a taxpayer incorporated his proprietor-
ship under section 351. The Tax Court required him to include, in his
personal income, the balance in his reserve account for bad debts. Since
there was no longer a need for the reserve, the amount therein had to be
restored to income. This was not tantamount to taxing the gain on the
transfer of assets, protected by section 351, but was considered merely
a restoration to income under a system of accounting.
In cases where section 351 is inapplicable, or where it is applicable but
part of the gain realized is also recognized, the taxpayer must be aware of
section 1239.'g Under the latter section, where there is a sale of de-
preciable property between a corporation and an individual who owns
more than 80% of the stock in the corporation, the gain is taxed as
ordinary income.
In Harry Trotz,4 ' the taxpayer sold his construction business assets,
to a new corporation in which he owned only 79% of the stock. The
other 21 % was owned by an employee, to whom Trotz had advanced the
purchase price, and in turn, the employee pledged his stock to Trotz
and gave Trotz an option to buy it at book value. The Tax Court held
that Trotz had virtually complete control, and for tax purposes, was
the owner of more than 80% of the stock. Accordingly, the gain on
the depreciable assets was taxed as ordinary income.
A number of loss corporation cases were decided, mostly adverse to
the taxpayers. Usually, they involved factual issues under section 269,
41
which disallows the loss carryover if the principal purpose in the acquisi-
tion of the loss corporation is the avoidance of the Federal income tax
laws. Typical of such cases, but not otherwise significant, was Herbert
Luke.4 2
In Euclid-Tennessee, Inc.41 the Tax Court did not have to decide the
section 269 issue. It denied a loss carryover because, after the merger,
the taxpayer did not meet the requirement prescribed by section 382,
4
of carrying on substantially the same trade or business that generated
the loss. The losses were incurred in a beer business, which had been
abandoned for 22 years, during which time, the taxpayer did nothing
except rent the real estate used in the beer business. The taxpayer had
been formed for the purpose of dealing in beer, not real estate. To the
same general effect is Frederick Steel Co.,4 5 also involving beer.
Reversing the Tax Court in an important decision, the Sixth Circuit,
38. 42 T.C. No. 90 (Sept. 1964).
39. CODE § 1239.
40. 43 T.C. No. 13 (Nov. 1964).
41. CODE § 269.
42. P-H 1964 TAX CT. MEM. 64,193.
43. 41 T.C. No. 74 (March 1964).
44. CODE § 382.
45. 42 T.C. No. 13 (April 1964).
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in Zanesville Investment Co.,4 6 held that section 269 did not bar the
netting, on consolidated returns, of post-acquisition losses of one corpo-
ration against post-acquisition income of another. Section 269 was in-
tended to bar the use of someone else's loss or a built-in but unrealized
loss, that is, a loss economically accrued prior to the affiliation. Section
269 was not designed to prevent the use of actual cash losses incurred
both economically and tax-wise after the affiliation.
Under section 302, 4 7 the redemption of a taxpayer's stock in a corpora-
ton is, under some circumstances, treated as a dividend from the
corporation to the shareholders, while under other circustances, the
shareholder derives a capital gain or possibly no gain. Dividend treat-
ment is avoided, if the taxpayer's entire interest in the corporation is
terminated by the redempton. For the purpose of determining whether
the taxpayer's entire interest has been redeemed, stock ownd by certain
members of his family may be deemed constructively owned by, or
attributed to, the taxpayer. The family attribution rules, do not apply
if the taxpayer does not acquire an interest in the corporation for 10
years and agrees to notify the Commissioner if he does. In Pearce v.
U.S., 48 the taxpayer was allowed capital gains treatment on a stock
redemption, even though the taxpayer inadvertently failed to file the
agreement until his return was audited. Dividend treatment under
section 302 may be avoided if the facts are such that the distribution
by the corporation is not essentially equivalent to a dividend. In Boyd
v. U.S.,4 9 a jury found for the taxpayer on this issue. This case contains
exhaustive instructions which may serve as models.
In The Humacid Company,50 the taxpayer held corporate notes which
he gave to a charity after they had appreciated in value. The corpora-
tion then bought the notes from the charity. The Tax Court, permitted
the taxpayer a charitable contribution deduction for the value of the
notes and refused to tax him on income from the bail-out by the corpora-
tion from the charity, even though he contemplated it at the time of the
contribution. However, the same taxpayer was taxed on the income
derived from a similar bail-out of other notes, which he sold to a third
party who was held to be a mere conduit.
In Commissioner v. Brown,5 1 the taxpayer instead of giving his stock
to charity, sold it to a charity on the installment basis, taking a note
for the sale price. Based upon a complex, carefully planned scheme,
the purchase price was to be paid solely out of 90% of the earnings of
the business. The taxpayer and other employees continued in the em-
46. 64-2 USTC CCH 1 9700 (6th Cir. 1964).
47. CODE § 302.
48. 226 F. Supp. 702 (W.D. N.Y. 1964).
49. 64-2 USTC CCH 9651 (D. N.J. 1964).
50. 42 T.C. No. 68 (Aug. 1964).
51. 325 F. 2d 313 (9th Cir 1963). Cert. granted, 377 U.S. 962 (1964).
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ploy of the business at their former salaries. Contrary to the Commis-
sioner's contention that there really was not a sale, the Ninth Circuit
held, that the sale was genuine and that the taxpayer realized capital
gains on the installment basis.
Holding invalid the Commissioner's regulations to the contrary, the
Coady52 in 1961, and the Marett"3 case in 1963, held that section 35554
applies to a spin-off division of a single business. Its benefits are not
confined to the spin-off of one of two separate and distinct businesses.
In Revenue Ruling 64-147, 55 the IRS ruled that it would follow these
decisions and that it was considering a modificaton of the regulations.
But the TIR was issued after Patricia W. Burke56 was tried and briefed,
but before decision by the Tax Court. Following issuance of the TIR,
the taxpayer and Regional Cousel brought the ruling to the attention of
the Tax Court Judge and the case was submitted only for a factual de-
termination of whether a branch was a separate business, and if so,
whether there was a valid business reason for separation.
Section 355 applies only if the spin-off business has been actively con-
ducted throughout a 5-year period, ending on the date of the distribu-
tion of the stock. In the last mentioned case-the Burke case-the stock
of a subsidiary, operating a branch in a dfferent city from the parent,
was distributed to the stockholders of the parent. At that time the sub-
sidiary had been incorporated only for a year. But prior to incorpora-
tion, the branch store operated as an unincorporated branch for 2 years,
and prior to that, a salesman operated in the City. Favoring the tax-
payer, the Tax Court computed the 5 years by tacking all three periods
together.
Similarly, in W. E. Gabriel Fabrication Co.,57 it was held that the
time during which a predecessor proprietorship operated a business
counted toward the 5-year period. As long as the business had been
operated 5 years prior to the stock distributon, it did not have to be
operated that length of time by either the distributing corporation or
the controlled corporation.
A problem is presented in a parent-subsidiary situation, in which the
subsidiary is managed by the owners of V3 of the stock of the parent
and the parent desires to distribute all of its stock in the subsidiary to its
managers, thereby resolving a disagreement in management policy. How-
ever, the stock of the subsidiary is not as valuable as the Y3 stock of
the parent owned by the subsidiary's managers. Accordingly, in order
to equalize the values prior to the distribution, the parent contributes
52. 289 F. 2d 490 (6th Cir. 1961).
53. 325 F. 2d 29 (5th Cir. 1963).
54. CODE § 355.
55. Rev. Rul. 64-20. 1964 INT. REV. BULL. No. 12.
56. 42 T.C. No. 81 (Sept. 1964).
57. 42 T.C. No. 53 (July 1964).
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cash to the capital of the subsidiary, thereby making the subsidiary's
stock more valuable. This procedure was approved in Revenue Ruling
64-102.58 It was not prohibited by section 355 as a device for the dis-
tribution of earnings, because if it had been taxable, it would have been
taxable, not as a dividend, but as a capital gain on the complete termina-
tion of an interest under section 302.
As the sole stockholder of a corporation having large accumulated
earnings, you completely liquidate the corporation, thereby receiving
not only the accumulated earnings but also the operating assets. You
then form a new corporation to which you transfer the operating assets,
and continue on your "Merry" way. You assume that you will derive a
long-term capital gain on the liquidation, thereby avoiding the necessity
of "pocketing" your earnings through the dividend route. You've as-
sumed incorrectly. This one-time favorite device has been rather ef-
fectively resisted by the Commissioner.
The Commissoner has usually relied on Sections 368,"' 354,"0 and
35661 to spell out a "D" reorganization accompanied by a distribution of
cash "boot" which is taxable as an ordinary dividend. Taxpayers have
sought to avoid those sections on various theories, one of which is that
they are inapplicable unless "substantially all" the assets are transferred
to the new corporation. In John C. Moffatt,6 2 the Tax Court held that
the assets need not be limited to those shown on the transferor's balance
sheet, and that the most valuable asset of an engineering consulting firm
was its staff of trained personnel, all of whom joined the new corpora-
tion. In Pridemark, Inc.,6" for want of a better theory, the Tax Court
held, that instead of a complete liquidation, there was an "F" reorganiza-
tion which is defined as "a mere change in the identity, form or place of
organization." 64
Under Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code,6 5 a so-called small
business corporation may elect not to be taxed as a corporation. Instead
it will be taxed under special rules resembling those applicable to part-
nerships. Among numerous limitations are those that the electing corpo-
ration cannot have more than one class of stock, and that the election
will be terminated if the corporation has gross receipts, more than 20%
of which, is derived from rents.
In Catalina Homes, Inc. 66 stockholder advances were held to be a
58. INT. REV. BULL. 64-13, 9.
59. CODE § 368.
60. Id., § 354.
61. Id., § 356.
62. 42 T.C. No. 56 (July 1964).
63. 42 T.C. No. 50 (July 1964).
64. CODE § 368(a) (1) (F).
65. CODE § 1371 et seq.
66. P-H 1964 TAx CT. MEM. 6425.
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second class of stock, thereby causing the taxpayer corporation to be
disqualified under Subchapter S. The decision itself is not particularly
troublesome except in this respect: It is generally desirable to distribute
all the income of a Subchapter S corporation to its stockholders. How-
ever, if the corporation needs money for use in its business the stock-
holders may want to lend the income back to the corporation. Query,
whether such loans will be treated as a second class of stock under the
Catalina case? On a more liberal note, is Revenue Ruling 64-232,67 that
allowed Subchapter S status to a corporation which leased items of per-
sonal property, and, in connection therewith, provided delivery, pickup,
cleaning, repairing and storing services. The amounts received were
not deemed to be rents.
Under Revenue Ruling 64-279,"' the Internal Revenue Service will
consider requests for advance rulings relating to deferred compensation
arrangements. Perhaps the best way to provide for widows of deceased
corporate officers is through such an arrangement. In Loewy Drug
Company, 9 Interstate Drop Forge Ca., 0 and in Schner-Block Co.,7 1
corporations were denied deductions for payments to widows. The
payments were ordinary but not necessary. They were not prompted
by business considerations; no benefit to the respective corporations was
derived; no contention was made that the payments represented addi-
tional compensation for past services; and they were not made pursuant
to a contract. In deciding how much compensation is to be paid for the
services of our hypothetical executive, we may find that the amount of
time he devoted to the business is not too relevant. In the interesting
McWane 7 1 case, the Fifth Circuit stated that it was well accepted in
the business world, that an executive's salary is not dependent upon the
amount of time spent on the job. He may do some of his most creative
work while relaxing at home.
In the Electric Regulator7 3 case, reversing the Tax Court, the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit held, that the corporation was not
liable under Section 531 et seq for the accumulated earnings penalty tax.
Procedurally and substantively, both the Tax Court and the Court of
Appeals decisions are required reading. The taxpayer won despite large
cash balances and increased surpluses. According to the Court of Ap-
peals, the Tax Court completely disregarded the basic proposition that,
to the extent surplus has been translated into plant expansion, increased
receivables, large inventories and other assets relating to its business, a
67. INT. REV. BULL. 64-34, 13.
68. INT. REV. BULL. 64-43, 8.
69. 64-2 USTC CCH 1 9718 (7th Cir. 1964).
70. 64-1 USTC CCH 9182 (7th Cir. 1964).
71. 329 F. 2d 875 (2nd Cir. 1964).
72. 331 F. 2nd 921 (5th Cir. 1964).
73. 336 F. 2nd 339 (2nd Cir. 1964).
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corporation may accumulate surplus with impunity. The earnings which
had been converted into bricks, mortar, machinery, equipment and in-
ventory were scarcely available for current expenses or expansion. The
cash balances had to be reduced by all the current liabilities and, con-
trary to the commissioner's contenton, could not be paid as dividends.
In Luhring Motor Co.,7 4 and in Gunderson Brothers Engineering
Corp.,75 the taxpayers sold vehicles on a deferred payment basis, adding
finance charges to the cash selling price. Instead of accruing the finance
charges as income along with the accrual of the selling price, they ac-
crued the finance charges monthly as the installments were collected.
The Tax Court held this method to be correct under secton 446.78 The
finance charges being earned only over the lives of the contracts. The
automobile dealer reserve cases and the prepaid income cases, all adverse
to the taxpayers, were distinguished. In the Luhring case, even though
there was no express provision in the contracts for the abatement of
finance charges, the evidence made it clear that it was the taxpayer's
custom, as well as that of other dealers in the Tidewater area, to abate
unpaid finance charges in the event of contract cancellation or termina-
tion.
We therefore see that the 1964 decisions and rulings, while consistent
with previous findings do provide us with substantial precedents.
74. 42 T.C. No. 53 (July 1964).
75. 42 T.C. No. 38 (June 1964).
76. CODE § 446.
